Wednesday, April 15, 2009

Time Banks

I'm way behind on answering blog-related e-mail, but keep sending them. I'm hoping to catch up.

A Fin 6250 student sends in some interesting notes on "time-banking." Check it out here.

Here we have an example of people trading, but not using money to do it.

I think this sort of trade is a step up (in terms of efficiency) from barter, and a step down from using money.

I'll try to explain why, but first we need to think about where trade comes from in the first place.

Gains from trade --- that is, an opportunity for parties to trade and both be made better off --- exist any time two individuals have different marginal rates of substitution among two goods.

What’s a “marginal rate of substitution”? My marginal rate of substitution for, say, oranges with apples is how many apples I’d need to be given in order to give up an orange. Suppose I’m indifferent between one orange and two apples. Then I'd be willing to give up an orange as long as I get two or more apples back. Then my MRS for oranges with apples is 2.

Any time your marginal rate of substitution is different from mine, then gains from trade exist. If your MRS for oranges with apples is 1, then you can give me one orange and I’ll give you 1.5 apples, and we’re both better off. If your MRS for oranges with apples is 4, then I can give you an orange and you give me three apples, and again we’re both better off.

So the simplest form of trade is barter. You and I get together to talk. We figure out where our MRS's are different, and we trade. As examples, think about the early fur traders coming to North America and trading European goods for beaver pelts. Native Americans are thinking "We are up to our ears in beaver pelts --- I'd give up to five of them for an iron kettle." The Europeans think "Wow, I can easily get my hands on another iron kettle. I'll give up my kettle for three or more pelts." The parties are both made better off by exchanging four pelts for a kettle.

Barter has some problems, however. One of the big problems with barter is what happens if I don't have anything you want.

Consider, specifically, the following: I am good at plumbing. You are good at cutting hair. You have a plugged sink. I am bald.

Can we trade? I'm not going to give you an hour of plumbing time for nothing back. And you don't have anything I want. So we can't barter.

But what if there's another person out there who needs a haircut and is a chef? And suppose further I'm hungry. Then there's a three-way barter that makes us all better off. The issue, however, is that you're only going to get your plumbing done if we happen to find this chef at exactly the time your sink clogs. And coordinating so that all three of us are present at the same time is going to be tough.

We can overcome this coordination problem by devising a reliable "store of value," and that's what the time bank is. Suppose I do your plumbing. You now owe the time bank an hour of hair cutting. I am owed an hour of something by the time bank. I can then go "spend" my hour on the chef --- and notice that the chef doesn't even have to know where my hour in the bank came from, nor does she have to be present when I do your plumbing. The chef can then take the hour she earns from me, and buy a haircut from you.

Having a store of value facilitates trade, because it alleviates the problem of having to have everybody involved in a three-way barter present at the same time.

So why do we use "money" rather than a "time dollars" as the store of value in our economy?

One problem with time dollars is that the store of value works best when everyone --- and I mean everyone --- agrees on what the store of value is and will be. Specifically, I'm only willing to trade my plumbing time for time dollars if I'm pretty sure that somebody will, in the future, be willing to accept my time dollars in exchange for something I want. The more people who accept time dollars, the more likely that there's someone who will accept time dollars for something I want. Further, if I'm worried that at some point the time dollars system will break down and future people won't accept the time dollars, then I'll be reluctant to accept time dollars today.

Given these issues, we facilitate the most trade by having a single store of value. And that's one socially valuable role of "money."

Thursday, April 9, 2009

Fix Director Pay

I recently referenced my ongoing conversation with old friends Rafe and Kevin regarding CEO Pay. The conversation, in the end, degenerated into sophomoric name calling. Just like it did when we were all, uh, sophomores.

But before the verbal melee (which I clearly won, btw), some interesting stuff got said that I thought I'd comment on.

Kevin, responding to a Rafe point, wrote:

Any compensation scheme will eventually start to be gamed. So you have to constantly improve them.

By "gaming," we usually mean two things. Either (1) the employee takes an action that improves measured performance (and hence increases pay) but doesn't actually create value, or (2) the employee fails to take an action that would create value, because taking that action doesn't increase measured performance.

Except in a very few cases, it's generally true that explicit pay-for-performance schemes can be gamed. This stems from problems in measuring performance. Unless your way of measuring performance reflects all the things you want done and none of the stuff you don't want done, you're due for some gaming behavior.

So, what can you do about gaming?

Option (1) Live with it. This option works best when the gaming isn't that costly to the firm. For many salespeople, for example, pay comes from sales commissions. This is an explicit pay-for-performance contract that rewards salespeople who sell more, so that's pretty good alignment between the measure and what the firm wants done. However, there are some documented examples of gaming, even here. Many commission contracts feature quotas or other kink points. Suppose for example that I'm a salesperson whose contract calls for a $10,000 bonus if I hit annual sales of $2 million. Suppose it's December 15, and I've already hit my target --- I'm best off pushing all sales for the rest of this year into next year. This probably isn't what the firm wants me to do, since competition could find these customers and try to steal them away as I dawdle to push the sales into next year. Paul Oyer (at Stanford) and Ian Larkin (HBS) have written nice papers documenting this.

Option (2) Don't use pay-for-performance incentives at all. This option works best when the gaming is really bad. If you think about some of the objections to pay-for-performance for public schoolteachers, they usually go along these lines. Some teachers unions argue that paying teachers for raising student test score causes reductions in education quality, because teachers misdirect their effort toward test scores and away from other valuable educational activities. The argument is that teacher gaming would be so bad that we're better off with no incentive pay than with incentive pay that's directed at test scores.

Option (3) Use subjective assessments of employee performance in addition to the explicit pay-for-performance plan. The idea here is that a "boss" subjectively assesses whether employee performance was achieved in the "right" way. Both the subjective assessment and the numerical measure play a role in determining pay. Examples: A salesperson's supervisor might pay attention to whether the saleperson's performance slackens after a target is met, and reduce pay if so. A school principal might tell a teacher to raise test scores as much as possible, but then monitor the teacher to make sure that the teacher doesn't drop art and science to simply do arithmetic drills all day.

A final example: A board of directors might monitor the CEO to make sure that earnings growth is achieved in a sustainable manner. There is evidence that boards do at least some of this: See my paper with Rachel Hayes from the RAND Journal of Economics in 2000.

So, getting back to the Rafe and Kevin conversation, if it's impossible to design a bulletproof pay-for-performance plan, then maybe instead we think about making sure that we're combining the (inherently flawed) explicit pay-for-performance plan with strong board oversight and subjective evaluation.

One of the big problems with subjective evaluation of performance, however, is that we now face the problem of providing incentives for the evaluator to give good evaluations.

And so one response to Rafe's initial idea is this: Let's not think that making a one-size-fits-all change to explicit pay-for-performance plans can solve all our corporate governance problems. Probably this could never work due to the inherent problems of measuring performance. So let's instead continue to give directors the freedom to compensate CEOs in the way that fits the specific needs of the firm. But let's also figure out how to give stronger incentives to directors to do a good job monitoring CEOs.

Easier said than done, but I'll post some thoughts sometime.

Tuesday, April 7, 2009

Local Entrepreneurs

I've been involved the last few years with vSpring Capital's v100.

This is a list of movers-and-shakers among the local entrepreneurship community, as nominated and voted by peers. I'm on the v100 Audit Committee, which means I help oversee the selection and voting process to insure objectivity.

The 2009 list is just out, and I've been meaning to post something about it. Luckily for me, the Salt Lake Tribune beat me to it, so I'll just link to their article instead.

Congratulations to all of this year's v100 members!